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I. Introduction
There is something about law and change (whether social or technological) that
seems vaguely incompatible. Legal institutions are often accused of failing to “keep up”
with change, and those accusations may sometimes be justified. At least in cases of
technological change, the dilemma is generated by the interaction between existing law
and new forms of conduct. Criticism tends to be levelled in circumstances where: (1)
existing rules no longer achieve their purposes due to the changed nature of the world in
which they operate, (2) there is ambiguity as to whether new forms of conduct fall within
the scope of existing laws, (3) the inclusion or exclusion of new forms of conduct within
the scope of existing rules is thought inappropriate, or (4) what law does apply may be
inadequate to meet legitimate concerns arising out of the new conduct.
Much has been written about how the law ought to change in light of the
technology of genetic testing. At first blush, the problems raised by the existence of
genetic testing do not seem “new.” Prior to the use of genetic testing, people often knew
vast amounts of information about their genetic heritage. Such information was derived
from family histories as well as observable physical and psychological characteristics.
However, prior to the use of genetic testing, one could withhold little genetic information
from family members because they were able to derive similar information from family
histories and observation. The use of genetic testing alters the information symmetry that
previously existed within families. The results of a genetic test are not visible and may
never manifest in observable features or symptoms. Thus, for the first time, people have
control over their genetic information; they can decide how much to share with others.
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Decisions as to whether to share information about susceptibility to genetic diseases with
family members who might be affected are in that sense unique or “new.”
Information derived from a genetic test is deeply personal, yet also directly
relevant to other people in the same family. For the person tested (hereinafter “proband”),
the information might predict health problems far into the future and have a significant
impact on identity. On the other hand, genetic information, unlike medical information
pertaining to infections and injury, does not relate to only one person. If a person carries a
particular gene, it is likely that at least one of that person’s parents carry the gene, and
possible that the gene is carried by siblings, children, cousins, and even more distant
relatives. The nature of genetic information generally, and information about genetic
diseases in particular, is discussed in Section II below.
A person who discovers that he or she carries a gene associated with a genetic
disease faces a new choice: the decision as to how much information to share with
genetic relatives. The person making that decision will want to know what they ought to
do, both in the moral and the legal sense. This Article considers the constraints affecting
the decision to share information regarding genetic diseases with relatives. Section III
focuses on the factors that a person faced with the decision might take into account and
Section IV focuses on legal obligations, concluding that, while legal obligations ought to
be imposed in extreme cases, this is unlikely on the current state of the law.
The questions considered in this Article are more relevant now than they ever
were or will be. Previously, when few genetic tests were performed, the matters
considered here did not affect a significant number of people. On the other hand if, as is
likely, genetic testing becomes a routine part of health care, the problems of information
2

asymmetry within families will all but disappear.1 In that sense, the problems posed by
this Article are largely temporary. Nevertheless, at least at present, significant numbers of
people are facing the decision as to how much genetic information to share with relatives
with relatively little guidance.
II. Genetic Diseases
The basic nature of inheritance is generally well-known; what follows is a
simplified account. A person’s genome, which resides in the nucleus present in most
human cells, consists of twenty-three pairs of chromosomes. One chromosome from each
pair is inherited from each parent. Each chromosome is composed of double strands of
deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA. DNA consists of strings of nucleotide bases, certain
sequences code for particular proteins. Such sequences are referred to as genes.
Because different genes code for different proteins, many physical and
psychological human characteristics are related to one or more genes, often in addition to
environmental factors. Where proteins important for biological function are altered or
absent due to one or more “defective” genes, a person may suffer severe physical
consequences, resulting in illness or death. Although this simplifies matters somewhat,
the term “genetic disease” will be used to describe illness whose primary cause is a defect
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See Allen Buchanan, Ethical Responsibilities of Patients and Clinical Geneticists, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 391, 399 (1998).
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in one or more genes.2 Genetic diseases are often classified into monogenic disorders,
involving a single gene, and polygenic disorders, involving multiple genes.3
The extent of the relationship between a defective gene and the corresponding
genetic disease varies significantly. An example of a monogenic disorder with a close
relationship between the disease and a particular gene is Huntington disease. All cases of
Huntington disease result from a defect in the associated gene, and certain defects will
always lead to development of the condition, provided the person lives long enough.4 A
weaker relationship exists in the case of breast cancer, only 5 to 10 breast cancers are
genetically linked and not everyone with the relevant genes will develop the disease.5 In
the case of sporadic Alzheimer disease, carrying the associated ApoE4 gene is one of
many risk factors for developing the disease.6 Further, in some cases, a genetic disease
may arise through mutation rather than inheritance.7
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Note that this definition does not include chromosomal disorders. Further, a proper definition would need
to account for the fact that diseases rarely have a single cause. For example, skin cancer may be caused by
both exposure to the sun (an environmental factor) and pale skin (a genetic factor). This Article will focus
on situations where the genetic cause is invisible and relatively rare and the environmental causes are
commonplace.
3

It should be noted that, because polygenic disorders involve the interaction of two or more genes as well
as, in most cases, environmental factors, fewer predictions can be made on the basis of genetic testing or
family history data. See Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role of Autonomy,
Confidentiality, and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial Group Rights in Genetic Information,
22 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 5 (2001). In addition, information derived from polygenic disorders is likely to have
less impact for the proband’s family, because the probability of inheriting the same combination of genes
decreases as the number of genes involved increases.
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THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENETIC DISORDERS 569-71 (Stacey L. Bachford ed., 2002).
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Id. at 173-78.
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See id. at 65-70; John Bell, The New Genetics in Clinical Practice, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 618 (1998).
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Genetic diseases that are primarily the result of mutation will not be considered further in this Article.
Where a genetic disease could be the result of a mutation or inheritance, the calculations become somewhat
complicated. Essentially, in the absence of other information, one would factor out the known incidence of
mutations.
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Until recently, information regarding one’s propensity to develop a genetic
disease was usually derived from family histories, consisting of descriptions of symptoms
experienced by oneself or family members. Today, genes associated with particular
diseases can be detected directly through genetic testing.8 People undergo genetic testing
for a variety of reasons. A person may be tested as part of a research project, as an aid to
diagnosis in the clinical context, as an aid to reproductive decision-making (before or
after conception), as part of a compulsory or voluntary genetic screening program, or out
of personal curiosity. Information derived from genetic testing rather than from family
history is not only more accurate, it is also more specific. Learning about one’s own
genome can affect people differently than drawing inferences based on what has
happened to others. Specific information can seem more reliable as a prediction of future
ill health, whether or not that is statistically the case.9
As a matter of pure statistics, a genetic test reveals useful information about the
proband (person being tested) and their relatives. The probability that a proband who tests
positive for a particular gene or set of genes will develop symptoms of the associated
disease will depend on the reliability of the laboratory where the test was performed, the
accuracy of the test itself, and the penetrance of the gene or set of genes (being the
probability that a person carrying the gene or genes will develop the disease). Throughout
this Article, the term “genetic disease information” is used to describe information
relating to the probability that that person will develop a particular genetic disease.
Genetic disease information thus describes the chance that a person’s health will be
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The term “genetic testing” is used to refer to a range of procedures including linkage analysis, Southern
blotting and DNA sequencing.

9

See Laurie, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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negatively affected by one or more genes.10 Mathematically, the probability measured is
the product of the probability that a person carries a particular gene and the penetrance of
that gene.
Genetic disease information pertaining to one person can often be derived from
genetic disease information pertaining to a member of that person’s family. For example,
if a man knows that his mother has or will develop Huntington disease, he also knows
that he has 50% chance of developing the same condition. Because similar calculations
are possible for many genetic diseases, genetic disease information never pertains to only
one person. In other words, genetic disease information about one person is often also
genetic disease information about his or her family, although the importance of the
information diminishes as the extent of blood relationship is reduced and as the number
of genes required for the expression of the trait increases.11 Nevertheless, genetic disease
information yielded by a genetic test has the greatest impact, statistically and
psychologically for the proband.12
If people do not share genetic test results with close family members, the resulting
asymmetry in information can potentially give rise to disputes. Family members who
later develop the disease may claim that, had the information been shared with them, they
could have taken precautions, reducing the probability of developing the disease. At the
opposite extreme, a person who does not wish to know whether they carry a defective
gene might complain of psychological harm if the information is shared. The ethical and
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Note that only genetic diseases are being considered. In particular, this Article does not discuss health
effects that are the result of a genetic propensity to engage in dangerous activities.
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See Laurie, supra note 3, at 3.
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See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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legal issues surrounding the decision to share genetic disease information with family
members will be considered in Sections III and IV respectively.
III.The Diligent Proband
A person who discovers that he or she carries a gene or set of genes associated
with a genetic disease must decide whether to share that knowledge with family members.
The decision is rarely an easy one; if undertaken in good faith, it involves many
conflicting considerations. This Section considers the factors that such a person,
attempting to make the most appropriate decision in the circumstances, would likely take
into account.
In the absence of other considerations, most people perceive an obligation not to
inflict harm and a more limited obligation to prevent harm.13 The obligation to prevent
harm cannot be treated as absolute; a single person does not have the resources to prevent
all preventable harm to all people. One might suppose, therefore, that the obligation only
arises where the costs of preventing harm are reasonable in light of the harm to be
prevented and any special obligations owed to the person who would otherwise be
harmed.14 In the circumstances under consideration, special obligations will usually arise
out of a close personal relationship, such as that often found between friends or members
of the same nuclear or extended family. Thus one might be more inclined to aid one’s
sibling than a third cousin one has never met.
As well as factors based on the potential for harm, issues of autonomy are
involved. Respect for others’ autonomy requires that one not compel another, who has
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See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 400-01.
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Id. at 401-02.
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already expressed a preference to remain ignorant, to gain unwanted knowledge.15 This
principle is of little use, however, unless the preferences of family members are known or
deducible from past conduct.
Factors likely to be relevant to the decision to pass on genetic disease information
to a specific family member (for convenience, X) include:
A. the extent to which X would benefit from the knowledge;
B. the extent to which X would be harmed by the knowledge;
C. any knowledge the proband may have (or be able to deduce or obtain) as to the
preferences of X in gaining such knowledge; and
D. in situations where the first three factors point towards an obligation to pass on
the information, the extent to which the proband would be harmed by disclosure
and the extent to which the proband ought, in the circumstances, to bear that
harm.16
These factors reflect a somewhat simplified model of the advantages and
disadvantages of sharing genetic disease information. Other factors may arise in specific
contexts. For example, sharing genetic disease information may stimulate intra-familial
conflict or increase intra-familial emotional support for those carrying the “defective”
gene or genes, and a conversation about genetic disease may affect the enjoyment of
family celebrations if poorly timed. Such contextual factors will likely be relevant to the
proband’s decision, but cannot be analyzed in the abstract.
15

See generally Laurie, supra note 3, at 19-23.
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These categories are a variation of the factors affecting the decision to share genetic disease information
with family members suggested in Buchanan, supra note 1, at 408 and Laurie, supra note 3.
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A. Benefits to Person Informed
There are many different kinds of benefits in learning about one’s propensity to
genetic disease. The most obvious benefit is that one might be able to use advance
knowledge to reduce either the probability that one will develop that disease or the
severity of the symptoms that will eventually be experienced. Secondary benefits,
including psychological benefits in having advance knowledge and the ability to make
more “informed” decisions, may also be taken into account.
The primary benefit to X in receiving genetic disease information is that such
knowledge might reduce the probability or extent to which the genetic disease will affect
X. Assuming that advance knowledge would benefit X in this way, the extent of the
benefit will depend on four factors: (1) the probability that genetic disease will in fact
develop, taking into account the probability that X carries the relevant gene or genes
(based on the genetic disease information)17 and the penetrance of the gene or genes, (2)
the severity of the symptoms that would be experienced by X if the genetic disease
manifested itself, 18 (3) the extent to which the path of the disease can be altered by
advance treatment or changes in lifestyle, and (4) the probability that X would choose to
pursue such treatment or lifestyle changes.19

17

This factor would take account of the accuracy of the test, the reliability of the laboratory performing the
test, and the nature of the genetic relationship between X and the proband.
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Because the expressivity of a gene or set of genes, being the severity of the condition with which it is
associated, can vary between individuals, this can only be estimated in advance. Some conditions have
more variable etiologies than others; for example, neurofibromatosis can result in either severe or minor
medical problems. THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENETIC DISORDERS, supra note 4, at 811-13.
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The probability that X would choose to pursue treatment will depend on what is known about X’s beliefs,
psychology, and resources as well as on the nature of the available treatments.
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Despite the promise of advance knowledge as creating opportunities for advance
treatment or lifestyle changes, few genetic diseases are susceptible to advance
interventions.20 For example, there is no effective preventative treatment for one of the
best known and most horrific genetic disorders, Huntington disease. There are at least
some cases where effective treatment is available; for example, a phlebotomy is an
effective treatment for hereditary hemochromatosis.21 There are many genetic diseases
between these extremes, but most cannot be effectively treated. Thus in the majority of
cases there is little primary benefit in having genetic disease information prior to the
onset of symptoms of the disease.
Nevertheless, there may be some indirect benefits in genetic knowledge. It may
give X an opportunity to prepare financially and psychologically in advance of the onset
of symptoms, or enable more “informed” life decisions.22 One category of life decisions
affected is reproductive decisions. A person who knows that their children may inherit a
particular gene might choose to avoid conception of an affected child, to use assisted
reproductive techniques to ensure no child inherits the gene, or to use prenatal testing,
either to prepare psychologically and financially for the birth of an affected child, or to
make a decision as to abortion. Generally speaking, the cases where reproductive
decisions are affected are not those where the relative’s health is affected. The sorts of
conditions that would have the most significant impact on reproductive decisions are
those associated with severe symptoms commencing at birth or in early childhood. These
20

TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, NIH-DOE WORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1997), available at <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/elsi/tfgt_final/index.html>.
21

A phlebotomy is a simple procedure involving the removal of blood.
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See the case studies referred to in Laurie, supra note 3, at 11-14. See also infra note 25
.
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conditions are associated with recessive genes; a person may carry one copy of a
recessive gene and remain unaffected, but a child inheriting the gene from both parents
will be affected. Tay Sachs is an example. In such cases, knowledge of carrier status will
not lead to treatment, lifestyle changes, or shortened life expectancy, but it might lead to
greater caution in reproductive decision making. The focus in this Article, however, will
be on situations where there are direct health or psychological consequences to X in
learning of a genetic risk.
All benefits to X that are the result of receiving genetic disease information must
be discounted by the probability that X would learn of his or her genetic status in any
event. In fact, X is likely to be prompted to seek genetic testing for many of the same
reasons that led the proband to be tested, including known family history and detectable
symptoms. The probability that X will become aware of the genetic disease information
in any event depends largely on the accessibility and pervasiveness of genetic testing,
both of which can be expected to increase over time.
B. Harm to Person Informed
Most of the harms that X is likely to suffer if informed of his or her genetic status
are the converse of benefits discussed in Section III(A) above. The converse of the
primary benefit, being avoidance or reduction of symptoms, is the cost of pursuing
treatment or life-style changes, evaluated in financial, physical, and psychological terms.
At the extreme, where treatment is extremely painful and difficult to come by, it no
longer provides a strong justification for disclosure. 23 The converse of the indirect

23

See T. Takala & H. A. Gylling, Who Should Know About Our Genetic Makeup and Why?, 175 WEST J.
MED. 260 (2001).
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psychological benefit in knowing one’s propensity to be affected genetic disease is the
more significant psychological harm such knowledge may cause. 24 The negative
psychological effects of learning that one carries the gene associated with a late-onset
fatal disease such as Huntington Disease are well-documented.25
In addition to harms associated with treatment, life-style changes and
psychological distress, a person who is aware of a genetic risk may face insurance and
employment discrimination. 26 Obviously, such harm will only result if the person
informed is required to disclose such information to their insurer or employer, which will
depend on the law of the relevant state. The potential for the genetic disease information
to harm X, like the benefits, must be discounted by the probability that X would gain
similar knowledge in any event.
C. Considerations of Autonomy
The principle of autonomy suggests that each person with capacity for reasoning,
deciding and willing have a right to self-determination. In particular, people owe
obligations to autonomous agents not to interfere with their decisions, including decisions
24

See generally the case studies referred to in Laurie, supra note 3, at 11-14.

25
See, e.g., Elisabeth W. Almqvist et al., A Worldwide Assessment of the Frequency of Suicide, Suicide
Attempts, or Psychiatric Hospitalization after Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease, 64 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 1293 (1999); Thomas D. Bird, Outrageous Fortune: The Risk of Suicide in Genetic Testing for
Huntington Disease, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1289 (1999); Maurice Bloch et al., Predictive Testing for
Huntington Disease in Canada: The Experience of Those Receiving an Increased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 499 (1992); Marguerite A. Chapman, Canadian Experience with Predictive Testing for
Huntington Disease: Lessons for Genetic Testing Centers and Policy Makers, 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS
491 (1992); Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attempted Suicide in Huntington Disease: Implications for
Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 305 (1986). See also Marlene Huggins et
al., Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease in Canada: Adverse and Unexpected Results in Those
Receiving a Decreased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 508 (1992).
26

Although the Health Insurance Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2000), prevents some uses
of genetic information in group insurance plans, it does not assist purchasers of individual insurance
policies or prevent insurers raising policy rates for people with some genetic conditions. State antidiscrimination and privacy legislation will be relevant in evaluating the risk of discrimination.
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as to whether to undergo genetic testing and learn the results of those tests. In most cases,
the situation cannot be fully analyzed by performing a utilitarian calculation as to the
benefits and harms of disclosure; the proband would usually take account of any choice
made by X, being the person most affected by disclosure. If X has already made an
informed choice to remain ignorant, respect for autonomy would require that they be
entitled to do so.27 This factor will come into play where, for example, X was already
aware of a family history of a particular genetic disease and has made a conscious
decision not to be tested (of which the proband is aware).
Such situations are rare. If, as is more likely, the proband is not aware of X’s
preferences, the principle of autonomy has little to say. While sharing genetic disease
information with X might enhance X’s autonomy by providing him or her with
information affecting other decisions,28 the decision whether to know, which itself has
important consequences, 29 will already have been made. 30 One might try to elucidate
information as to X’s preferences by asking an appropriately framed question. For
example, one might say to X, “I have some information about my own future health that
may affect yours; would you like to know it?”31 However, it is difficult to avoid making
the question too vague, in which case X’s response is uninformed and thus less credible,
or too precise, thus providing X with some information he or she may not wish to know.32

27

See Laurie, supra note 3, at 14.

28

Such as, for example, whether to seek treatment, whether to alter major life decisions, and whether to
have children.
29

In addition to consequences raised in Section III(B), supra, knowledge of genetic information can affect
X’s self-perception. See Laurie, supra note 3, at 21.

30

See generally id. at 21-23.

31

See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 405-06.

32

See Laurie, supra note 3, at 21.
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The only way out of this difficulty is to notify relevant family members before
undergoing genetic testing, and gauge their reactions at that stage. However, where
genetic testing is routine or undertaken in the context of an emergency, this possibility
will rarely be taken up. Even where this possibility exists and is taken up by the proband,
X may still be harmed because even discussing the fact that one will undergo genetic
testing may convey some genetic information,33 and may force X to address issues he or
she would prefer not to consider.
D. Harm to Informer and Principle of Reasonable Costs
If the three factors discussed above point towards disclosure, the proband will
likely take into account harms he or she may experience as a result of disclosure. As
noted above, few would act unless the costs of doing so are reasonable.
There are many harms that the proband may face as a result of disclosing genetic
disease information to X, from minor hassles, such as the time and cost involved in
contacting affected relatives, to the more serious concerns of stigmatization34 and loss of
privacy. There is also a slight but potent risk that the information might be spread further
to employers or insurance organizations, resulting in potential discrimination. 35 There
may, on the other hand, be benefits to the proband of sharing genetic test results; for
example, X may offer the proband emotional support.36

33

A person would usually seek genetic testing because they had some genetic disease information, whether
based on family history, symptoms pertaining to a genetic disease, or knowledge of the result of a genetic
test undertaken by a family member.

34

The risk is that one might be stigmatized by X and by anyone with whom X shares the information.

35

See supra note 26.

36

At least one study indicates that informing a sister that one carries one of the breast cancer genes,
BRCA1 or BRCA2, may decrease psychological distress. See Caryn Lerman et al., Family Disclosure in
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Assuming the proband feels likely to suffer as a result of disclosure, there may
nevertheless be circumstances where he or she would be prepared to bear those costs.
Generally speaking, the closer the familial or friendship ties between X and the proband,
the greater the costs the proband is likely to be prepared to bear and the greater the costs
X would likely expect the proband to bear. 37 Such increased expectations of mutual
protection can arise out of different types of family relationships, depending on cultural
context as well as the way in which the particular family has defined itself.38 Usually, a
person will feel a stronger inclination to share information with siblings and nuclear
family members than to share the information with more distant relatives.39
E. Weighing the factors
As can be seen from the above discussion, the factors involved in the proband’s
decision are complex. Even a conscientious person, with time to examine and weigh the
various factors, will ultimately face a difficult decision. One might imagine different
situations falling in different positions on a continuous spectrum. At the left end of the
spectrum are cases pointing strongly towards disclosure, and at the right end of the
spectrum are those cases where disclosure would clearly be inappropriate. Much will lie
in the middle, and in most situations neither a choice to share the information or a choice
to remain silent would be “wrong,” although one might argue that in such in between

Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility: Determinants and Consequences, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
353, 363-64 (1998).
37

See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 402-03.

38

See id.; Sumner B. Twiss, Jr., Ethical Issues in Genetic Screening: Models of Genetic Responsibility, in
ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE 225, 236-38
(Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974).
39

Of course, the information is likely more pertinent for close relatives than for more distant relatives. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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situations, the appropriate response is non-interference.40 The following Section analyses
the legal consequences might follow from a failure to warn in cases at the left end of the
spectrum, and a failure to remain silent in cases at the right end.
IV. Legal issues in sharing genetic disease information
The existence of moral arguments pointing towards or away from disclosure does
not necessarily make it appropriate to impose a legal duty. It may nevertheless be
appropriate to impose a legal duty in cases at the extreme ends of the spectrum, where a
decision to give or not to give a warning can have significant negative consequences. For
example, assume that a person discovers that they have hereditary hemochromatosis, a
potentially fatal disease where the simple procedure of phlebotomies is a largely effective
treatment. There is little cost in warning those most likely to be affected (in this case,
siblings) as there is negligible risk of discrimination or stigmatization in a close family
member knowing about a controllable genetic condition. On the other hand, if the
proband declines to do so, those affected by the same gene may face significant health
consequences, such as liver cirrhosis, diabetes mellitus, and congestive heart failure.41 A
close family member at risk for the same condition might expect to be warned of such
dangers. In addition to the normal expectations of mutual protection existing between
family members, the availability of genetic information increases the reliance and
dependence members of a family have on one another.

40

Laurie, supra note 3, uses the principle of spatial privacy to justify a preference for nondisclosure of
genetic disease information where disclosure could result in substantial harm. See generally infra Section
IV(C)(1).

41

THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENETIC DISORDERS, supra note 4, at 518-21.
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The concern that a legal obligation to disclose genetic disease information would
encourage disclosure in situations where such disclosure might cause harm is not justified.
The fact that the decision to share the information may involve complex considerations
does not justify refusing to impose legal obligations where all the factors point the same
way. It does, however, justify caution. Duties should not be imposed in situations where
the information might have caused as much harm as good, or in situations where
disclosure might cause significant harm to the proband. However, such considerations
ought not prevent a court imposing legal obligations where such harms are insignificant.
A. Duty to warn
Most commentators agree that, despite any moral obligation to share genetic
information, there is no legal requirement to do so. 42 Any legal duty to warn one’s
relatives that they may be at risk for a genetic disease would require positive conduct on
the part of the proband. Thus the main obstacle for a disappointed relative wishing to
assert the existence of a duty to warn is the traditional rule that there is generally no duty
to rescue. If a person can watch silently as a blind man walks in front of a truck, or smoke
a cigarette while a man drowns, then surely the proband can decline to share genetic
information, even in circumstances where that information might save the life or health of
another.43 The general principle that there is no duty to rescue is set out in the Second
Restatement of Torts:

42

See Ellen Wright Clayton, What Should the Law Say About Disclosure of Genetic Information to
Relatives?, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 373, 389 (1998); Sonia M. Suter, Whose Genes Are These
Anyway? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1887 (1993).
43

See examples given in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
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The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action.44
The origin of the no duty to rescue rule is usually assumed to be the common law
distinction between responsibility for actions and responsibility for omissions, or between
“misfeasance” and “nonfeasance,” 45 although this historical explanation has been
criticized.46 Despite the fact that the rule has been frequently criticized on moral47 and
logical48 grounds and theoretical bases for the existence of a duty to rescue have been
suggested,49 most jurisdictions refuse to impose liability for a failure to rescue unless a
recognized exception applies.50

44

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). See generally Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to
Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908) (explaining the distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance).
45

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965);
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373 (5th ed., 1984).

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
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Peter F. Lake, Boys, Bad Men, and Bad Case Law: Re-Examining the Historical Foundations of NoDuty-To-Rescue Rules, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (1999) (suggesting that “no duty to rescue” rules arose
largely in the context of socially unproductive behavior on the part of young males); Jean Elting Rowe &
Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of
Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807
(1995) (arguing that there is no logical distinction between action and inaction and that the legal distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance originates from a poor choice of words by the judge in Watkins’
Case, Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33 (1425)). See also James P. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care:
Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 147 (1981) (suggesting that distinctions between misfeasance and
nonfeasance are not part of the original conception of duty of care).
47

See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-113 (1908); Jay Silver, The
Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 428-34 (1985); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond
Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to
Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252 (1983). But see Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative)
About “Bad Samaritan” Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928-43 (1982).
48

See John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867; Rowe
& Silver, supra note 46.
49

See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994).

50

Vermont is an exception, having passed the Duty to Aid the Endangered Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 519(a) (2002) (imposing a fine on persons who decline to give reasonable assistance knowing that
someone is exposed to grave physical harm, at least where the assistance could be provided without danger
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This is not to say that there is never negligence liability for omissions; a defendant
who has a duty to act will be liable for the failure to do so.51 Affirmative duties are
recognized, inter alia, in cases involving special relationships and in cases where the
defendant’s omission was preceded by a positive act that harmed the plaintiff or created a
risk to the plaintiff. Special relationships will oblige a person to take reasonable action
where either:
SR1.

that person is in a special relation with another person, who is at unreasonable
risk of physical harm;52 or

SR2.

that person is aware that someone (X) will cause harm to another (Y) and has
either a special relationship with X that creates a duty to control X or a special
relationship with Y that gives Y a right to protection.53

A person also has a positive obligation to take reasonable care to prevent harm where:

or peril and would not interfere with other important duties). Louisiana and Wisconsin are also possible
exceptions. See Wicker v. Harmony Corp., 784 So. 2d 660, 665-66 (La. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 798
So.2d 115 (La. 2001) (although the case was decided on other grounds, the Court referred to the principle
that a person has no duty to rescue another as an “uncivilized common law concept” and stated that
Louisiana ought to follow civil law regimes that impose an obligation to rescue in some circumstances);
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 166 n.3 (stating that, under Wisconsin law, the court need not
engage in the “analytical gymnastics” required by adherence to the no duty to rescue rule and its
exceptions). Californian courts oscillate on this issue. Compare Adams v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d
196, 222-24 (1998) (describing the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance as “artificial
semantics”) with Eric J. v. Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), appeal denied, No.
S084937, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 2015 (Cal. 2000) (affirming the no duty to rescue rule) and Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 144 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“[M]isfeasance and nonfeasance do mark a
significant conceptual border.”) Other states have passed laws creating exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue
rule but none are sufficiently broad to cover the situation discussed here. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604A.01(1) (West Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002) (obligation to assist only arises at “the
scene of an emergency”).
51

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314 cmt. a, 284(b) (1965).

52

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (especially the Caveat and comment b).

53

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320 (1965).
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PA1. that person realizes or should realize that his or her previous conduct has
created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another;54 or
PA2. that person knows or has reason to know that, by his or her tortious or
innocent conduct, he or she has caused such bodily harm to another as to
make that other helpless and in danger of further harm.55
Thus there are at least four categories of exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule.
While these are neither universally recognized or comprehensive, and each state will
have its own formulation of the rule and its exceptions, these categories, derived from the
Restatement, provide a useful starting point for analysis. Before examining the
obligations of the proband, it is worth taking a brief look at the obligations owed by the
proband’s physician to the proband’s relatives.
1. Physician’s duty to warn
In professional,56 academic57 and government58 circles, as well as in the courts,59
obligations of physicians have been the focus of the debate as to whether and how
relatives of a person receiving a positive genetic test result ought to be informed.60

54

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965).

55

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965).

56

See John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome
Is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 763-64 (1990).
57

See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn of
Genetic Risks, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149 (1992); L.J. Deflos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future – The
Duty of Physicians to Disclose the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the
Disease, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (1997); Judith Hall, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS: GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE USE OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 23, 27 (Bruce
Hilton et al. eds., 1973); Michelle R. King, Physician’s Duty to Warn a Patient’s Offspring of Hereditary
Genetic Defects: Balancing the Patient’s Right to Confidentiality Against the Family Member’s Right to
Know – Can or Should Tarasoff Apply?, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1 (2000); Ruth Macklin, Privacy and
Control of Genetic Information, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 157, 162-64
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, eds. 1992); Alissa Brownrigg, Note, Mother Still Knows Best: Cancer-
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In the search for authority regarding a physician’s liability to non-relatives, two
categories of cases are usually referred to: the psychotherapist cases and the contagious
diseases cases. The basis for liability in the psychotherapist cases is an application of the
exception labeled SR2 above.61 The special relationship between therapist and patient can
in some circumstances create an obligation on the therapist to control the patient or warn
the potential victim. The contagious disease cases typically involve one of the following
situations: (1) a physician failed to diagnose a patient, who then unwittingly passed on
the disease, (2) a physician failed to give proper advice to the patient regarding necessary
means to avoid spread of the disease, or (3) a physician failed to directly warn third
parties in close contact with the patient as to means of avoiding infection.62 In imposing
positive obligations on physicians in these circumstances, the cases rely on duties owed
by a physician directly to his or her patient, the existence of public health statutes or the
SR2 exception to the no duty to rescue rule. Upon consideration of the principles
underlying the psychotherapist and contagious disease cases, it is clear that neither

Related Gene Mutations, Familial Privacy, and a Physician’s Duty to Warn, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J 247
(1999); Jeffrey W. Burnett, Comment, A Physician’s Duty to Warn a Patient’s Relatives of a Patient’s
Genetically Inheritable Disease, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 559 (1999); Angela Liang, Note, The Argument Against
a Physician’s Duty to Warn for Genetic Diseases: The Conflicts Created by Safer v. Estate of Pack, 1 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 437 (1998); Andrea Suddell, Comment, To Tell or Not to Tell: The Scope of
Physician-Patient Confidentiality When Relatives Are At Risk of Genetic Disease, 18 CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 273 (2001).
58

See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 43-45
(1983) (discussing the possibility of a physician’s duty to warn relatives following a clinical diagnosis of an
inheritable disease where efforts to elicit the voluntary consent of the patient to disclosure have failed).
59

See Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Safer v.
Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J. 1996).

60

There is also commentary concerning the obligations of genetic counselors, but that issue will not be
considered separately.

61

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

62

See infra notes 65 and 69.
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provides a useful analogy to the situation where a physician fails to warn his patient’s
relatives of a genetic risk.
Psychotherapists have been held liable for failure to take reasonable care to
protect a non-patient from the danger posed by a patient who threatens to harm the nonpatient where there is a serious danger of violence. 63 The basis of liability in these
circumstances is SR2; the therapist’s relationship with the patient is the source of the
obligation to prevent harm. The psychotherapist cases are distinguishable from situations
involving genetic diseases. Even leaving aside the absence of threatened violence in the
genetic context, the source of danger is not the relative, but the “victim’s” own genome.
Although the patient may be in a position to ameliorate the danger, the failure to does not
thereby become the source of danger. 64 Thus, any obligation on physicians to warn a
patient’s relatives of genetic risk would involve recognition of a new duty, unless it could
be based on the contagious diseases cases.

63

See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (“[O]nce a therapist does in fact
determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient
poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger”); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980)
(limiting Tarasoff to situations where the victim is readily identifiable). See also McIntosh v. Milano, 403
A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr.,
673 N.E.2d 1311, 1328-31 (Ohio 1997). The Tarasoff principle and its variants have been widely, although
not universally, accepted throughout the United States; see, e.g., Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he vast majority of other courts to address the issue … hold that when a psychologist
or other professional knows or pursuant to the standards of the profession should have known that a patient
presents a serious danger of violence to a readily identifiable victim, the psychologist has a common law
duty to take such protective actions as may be reasonable under the circumstances to warn the intended
victim or to communicate the existence of such danger to those likely to warn the victim, which may
inclu
de notifying appropriate law enforcement authorities.” (emphasis in original)). Although not relevant
for present purposes, note that some jurisdictions have codified the Tarasoff principle for warnings in the
mental health context. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-517.02 (1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West
1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (Mitchie Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-1102, 1103 (2001), N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 330-A:35 (Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7814a-102 (2002).
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Note, this Article does not address the obligations that might be owed to a spouse or sexual partner to
share genetic disease information so as to prevent harm to future children.
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There are two bases on which physicians have been held liable to non-patients in
the contagious diseases context. First, a failure to inform the patient of the genetic disease
information, may breach a duty to the patient, with liability extending to foreseeable third
parties.65 This principle could only give rise to an obligation on a physician to properly
explain the inheritable nature of a patient’s condition to the patient. In fact, the Florida
Supreme Court has limited a physician’s duties in the context of genetic disease
information to that obligation. 66 In Pate v. Threlkel, a physician’s duty of care to his
patient was assumed to include a requirement to discuss the genetically transferable
nature of the patient’s condition with the patient. 67 The court held that, because the
intended beneficiaries of such a standard of care would be the family of the patient,
members of the patient’s family who were known to the physician would be able to
recover for breach of that standard of care.68

65

See, e.g., Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
a claim arises where failure to warn a minor patient and her parents about dangers of HIV infection resulted
in infection of the patient’s subsequent sexual partner); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc.,
583 A.2d 422, 424-25 (Pa. 1990) (holding that physicians have a duty to advise patients as to how to
prevent the spread of a communicable disease and that liability extends to persons whose health was
threatened); Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tenn. 2001) (holding a physician
who failed to identify and warn a patient who had received blood transfusions at defendant hospital that she
was at risk for HIV infection liable to her future husband and child).

66

Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (“Our holding should not be read to require the
physician to warn the patient’s children of the disease. In most instances the physician is prohibited from
disclosing the patient’s medical condition to others except with the patient’s permission. … Moreover, the
patient ordinarily can be expected to pass on the warning. To require the physician to seek out and warn
various members of the patient’s family would often be difficult or impractical and would place too heavy a
burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any circumstances in which the physician has a duty
to warn of a genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.”).
67

Id. at 281. By virtue of the relevant Florida statute, this would be determined by expert testimony.

68

Id. at 282.
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Second, a failure to warn non-patients affected by the genetic disease information
may breach a duty owed separately to them.69 The rationales generally offered for the
second type of duty are the existence of physician’s obligations under public health
laws 70 and the “special relationship” between the physician and the patient,71 creating
liability pursuant to the SR2 exception to the no duty to rescue rule.72 The first rationale
simply does not apply to genetic diseases; sterilization laws and other means of
promoting a community’s “genetic health” are generally considered abhorrent.73 In the
contagious disease cases, as in the psychotherapist cases, the logic of SR2 assumes that
the patient poses an active threat (namely the risk of infection) arising out of a failure to
prevent harm. There is thus no justification for relying on either the psychotherapist or
the contagious diseases cases in considering whether the physician owes a duty to warn
non-patients of genetic risk.

69

See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 1921) (stating that physicians have a duty “to
exercise reasonable care to advise members of the family and others, who are liable to be exposed [to the
patient’s contagious disease], of the nature of the disease and the danger of exposure”); Hofmann v.
Blackmon, 241 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that physician’s assumed negligent failure to
diagnose patient with tuberculosis resulting in his failure to warn those responsible for his patient’s minor
child of the nature of the disease and means of avoiding infection would result in liability); Skillings v.
Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919) (holding that a physician who inaccurately advised the parents of
his minor patient who had scarlet fever that they could safely visit their child in hospital and bring the child
home liable to the parents); Edwards v. Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (holding physician who negligently
directed his patient’s spouse to assist in dressing an infectious wound liable to the spouse). Technically,
Skillings and Edwards involved misfeasance.
70

See, e.g., Skillings, 173 N.W. at 664 (discussing obligations to a patient’s family as if such obligations
were extensions of obligations under state public health laws); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County,
Inc., 583 A.2d 422 at 425 (Pa. 1990) (public health statute referred to as additional reason for imposing
liability).
71

See, e.g., Davis, 227 S.W. at 614 (noting that the position of physicians is analogous to a person “in
custody” of the patient); Shepard, 390 N.W.2d. at 245-46.

72

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

73

See Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical, Public
Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 269-77; Catherine J. Damme, Controlling
Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1982). But see Margery W. Shaw,
Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 93-95, 110-11 (1984).
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However, there is at least one case that could be used justify the imposition of a
physician’s duty to warn, namely Bradshaw v. Daniel. 74 In that case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court relied on the reasoning in the psychotherapist and contagious disease
cases to conclude that a physician owes a duty to warn those at risk from non-contagious
diseases. 75 In Bradshaw, Elmer Johns was admitted to hospital under the care of the
defendant physician. 76 Mr. Johns died in hospital, the cause of death being Rocky
Mountain Spotted Fever, a non-contagious disease transmitted by ticks. 77 Despite the
non-contagious nature of the disease, Mr. John’s wife was at increased risk due to
clustering, a phenomenon related to the activity of the infected ticks that transmit the
disease.78 However, the defendant physician failed to tell Mrs. Johns of the cause of her
husband’s death or warn her of the risk of exposure.79 The court held the physician liable
to Mrs. Johns, resting its conclusion on the proposition that a physician has an obligation
to protect identifiable third parties (such as the patient’s family) at foreseeable risk of
harm, even where that risk is not posed, either deliberately or accidentally, by the
patient.80 However, the basis of the court’s decision is difficult to discern. It cited no
authority apart from the psychotherapist and contagious diseases cases, which, as
explained above, are inapplicable where the patient poses no active threat. It is thus
unclear whether the reasoning in Bradshaw will be taken up by other state courts.

74

854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).

75

Id. at 872.

76

Id. at 866-67.

77

Id. at 867.

78

Id. at 872.

79

Id. at 867.

80

Id. at 872-73.
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Despite the dearth of relevant precedent, two New Jersey cases have imposed a
duty on physicians to warn a patient’s family of the risk of genetic disease. The first of
these, Schroeder v. Perkel,81 can be explained on other grounds. In that case, a physician
was held liable for failing to warn the parents of a minor patient that their child suffered
from cystic fibrosis and the parents were able to claim damages for the medical costs
incurred when their second child was born with the same condition.82 However, where
the patient is a minor child, it is customary to discuss important information with the
child’s parents, rather than the child itself. The court, therefore, did not need to consider
whether the obligation was to inform the patient or the patient’s family. Schroeder v.
Perkel is thus relatively uncontroversial and courts in other jurisdictions have imposed
obligations to inform the parents of minor children of genetic abnormalities.83
In Safer v. Estate of Pack,84 however, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court broke new ground. It held that a physician could be liable for failure to
take reasonable steps to ensure that information regarding avertable risks from genetic
causes reached family members likely to be affected.85 The court specifically noted that
this duty would not necessarily be fulfilled by informing the patient of the inheritable
nature of the condition.86 Like the Tennessee court in Bradshaw, the Safer court relied on

81

432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).

82

Id. at 839-42.

83

See, e.g., Molloy v. Meier, 660 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that while medical
practitioners owe an obligation to warn the parents of a minor child of genetic risks, no duty is owed to
family members where the patient is an adult).

84

Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1996), cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J.
1996).

85

Id. at 1192.

86

Id. at 1192 (“[I]t is appropriate that the duty [to warn of avertable risk from genetic causes] be seen as
owed not only to the patient himself but that it also extends beyond the interests of a patient to members of
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both the contagious disease and psychotherapist cases without discussing the distinction
between cases involving situations where the risk of harm was due to the patient’s
condition or intended conduct and cases where the risk of harm is pre-existing. It is
therefore unlikely that the reasoning Safer will be adopted by other state courts,
especially since the requirement that physicians discuss genetic diseases with their
patient’s family has been abolished by statute, at least during the patient’s life in the
absence of consent.87
In summary, it seems likely that, in circumstances where a physician’s standard of
care would require him or her to discuss the inheritability of the patient’s condition with
the patient, a failure to meet this standard may result in liability to family members. More
controversial is the situation where it is alleged that the physician had a duty to inform
the patient’s relatives directly. Although such a duty was found to exist in Safer v. Estate
of Pack,88 and possibly in Schroeder v. Perkel,89 and could be deduced from Bradshaw v.
Daniel,90 the foundation on which these cases rest is unclear.
In the event that, despite these difficulties, Safer91 is followed, the physician’s
obligation to warn will inevitably come into conflict with the duty of confidentiality. To
the extent this would breach the physician’s ethical duty,92 the President’s Commission

the immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of that duty.”) (citations
omitted)
87

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-47 (2002).

88

Id.

89

432 A.2d 834.

90

854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).

91

677 A.2d 1188.

92

See, American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics § IV (2001), available at
<http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html>. The ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality
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for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
has concluded that the duty can be overridden, but only where (1) reasonable efforts to
elicit voluntary consent to disclosure have failed, (2) there is a high probability that harm
will occur if the information is used to avert harm, (3) the harm that identifiable
individuals are likely to suffer would be serious, and (4) appropriate precautions are taken
to ensure that only the genetic information needed for diagnosis and/or treatment of the
disease in question is disclosed.93 Similar requirements were suggested by the Institute of
Medicine’s Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks 94 and the Task Force on Genetic
Testing created by the National Institutes of Health – Department of Energy Working
Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research.95 Slightly
different requirements were proposed by the American Society for Human Genetics’
Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure, which would permit disclosure
where: (1) harm is likely to occur and is serious, imminent and foreseeable, (2) the at-risk
relative is identifiable, (3) the disease is preventable, treatable, or medically accepted
standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the genetic risk, and (4) the harm
from failing to disclose outweighs the harm from disclosure.96 Although each proposal

in the physician-patient relationship originates with the Oath of Hippocrates: “Whatever, in connection
with my professional service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not
to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret”, available at
<ftp://ftp.std.com/obi/Hippocrates/Hippocratic.Oath>. See generally Roberta M. Berry, The Genetic
Revolution and the Physician’s Duty of Confidentiality: The Rule of the Old Hippocratic Virtues in the
Regulation of the New Genetic Intimacy, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 401 (1997).
93

PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 44.
94

COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIVISION OF HEALTH POLICY, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-23, 278 (1994).

95

TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 20.

96

Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure, American Society of Human Genetics, Professional
Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998).

28

has a different focus, all are based on considerations similar to those set out in Section III
above.
Although many organizations have assessed the limits of a physician’s ethical
duty of confidentiality, it is difficult to predict the circumstances in which the
corresponding legal duty would be abrogated. Federal law currently protects the
confidentiality of health information held by certain entities; health care providers who
conduct certain financial and administrative transactions electronically will need to
comply with those regulations.97 Otherwise, the legal duty of confidentiality is governed
by state law. Most states recognize a duty of confidentiality owed by physicians to their
patients, with exceptions for circumstances in which there is an overriding need to avert
harm.98 The existence and basis of a duty of confidentiality as well as the nature of the

97

See 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (2002). See, in particular, 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2002) (specifying the
entities to whom the regulations apply); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(iv) (2002) (regarding disclosure to a person
who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or may otherwise be at risk of contracting or
spreading a disease or condition) and 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2002) (regarding disclosure for the purposes
of preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public).
Neither of these latter two provisions are directly applicable to the disclosure of genetic disease information.
See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b) (2002) (setting out circumstances in which an individual’s family can
generally be provided with health information). Physicians to whom the regulation applies must comply
with the regime by April 14, 2003. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534(a) (2002).
98

See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1973) (duty of confidentiality applies except
where disclosure is prompted by a supervening societal interest or is in the patient’s private interest);
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. App. 1976) (duty of confidentiality
must be weighed against the public interest in safety from violent assault); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d
113, 119 (Mass. 1985) (duty of confidentiality applies except where there is a serious danger to the patient
or to others); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832-33 (Neb. 1920) (duty of confidentiality is not
breached where physician acts in good faith to prevent the spread of a contagious disease); Hague v.
Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) (duty of confidentiality applies except where disclosure is
prompted by a supervening societal interest or is in the patient’s private interest; physician can disclose
health information to those with a legitimate interest in the patient’s health); Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534-35 (Or. 1985) (duty of confidentiality applies except where disclosure is
required by law, is necessary for safety of individuals, or is in the public interest); McCormick v. England,
494 S.E.2d 431, 437-38 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (duty of confidentiality applies except where it is necessary to
disclose information in order to protect the interests of the patient or others); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d
814, 817-18 (Utah 1958) (duty of confidentiality applies except where there is a sufficiently important
interest to protect, such as life, safety, or well-being). See generally Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician’s
Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R.4th 668
(1986 & Supp. 2002). For a description of the application of confidentiality principles after a patient’s
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exceptions need to be assessed on a state by state basis.99 Safer v. Estate of Pack,100 being
the only case involving a physician’s duty to share genetic disease information with a
non-minor patient’s family, did not address the issue of confidentiality. The issue has, at
least for New Jersey, been resolved by legislation; a physician can only inform family
members at risk where the proband consents or has died.101
There are several reasons why imposing the obligation to inform relatives on
physicians is, from a normative perspective, less desirable than imposing the same
obligation on patients. First, the physician will generally be caught between two potential
sources of liability, liability to the patient for breach of the duty of confidentiality and
liability to the patient’s family for failure to warn. While there have been some
suggestions, by ethical bodies and in state law, as to the physician’s appropriate conduct
in different situations, the advice is not always clear. Second, if the information is to be
disclosed, most patients would rather retain control over the timing and context of the
disclosure. 102 In particular, having relatives informed by one’s physician may cause
additional harm to the patient, who may feel betrayed by their doctor and avoid trusting
medical practitioners in the future. Third, in situations where disclosure is essential, the

death, see Jessica Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 81 (2001).
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See cases referred to in infra note 98. In addition to common law rules, many states have general statutes
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website database of state health privacy laws , <http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-url_nocat2304/infourl_nocat.htm> (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains
website database of state laws specific to genetic privacy, <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/
ndislife.html> (last modified Apr. 15, 2002).
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Caryn Lerman et al., Family Disclosure in Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility: Determinants and
Consequences, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 353, 358, 368 (1998).
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moral obligation to share the information sits more heavily on the patient than on his or
her physician.103 Fourth, the patient is more likely to have the information necessary to
make an assessment as to the benefits and harms of disclosure set out in Section III.
Although a physician can easily communicate factors with which he or she is familiar,
such as medical prognosis and treatment, it is more difficult for a patient to explain
factors relating to a family member’s desire to know. Finally, as a practical matter, the
patient is more likely to have contact information for those who may be affected than his
or her physician. A duty to warn is thus less of an imposition if placed on the patient.
However, despite these considerations, there is even less legal basis for imposing a legal
obligation to warn on the patient than for imposing the obligation on his or her physician.
2. Patient’s duty to warn – special relationships
The most likely candidate for imposing positive obligations on the patient to warn
his or her own relatives is the first special relationships exception to the no duty to rescue
rule, SR1.104 The special relationships rule relied on in the context of physician’s duties,
SR2, is not relevant here because it involves three parties: the perpetrator, the victim, and
the person in a special relationship with either of them. The SR1 exception is based on
section 314A of the Second Restatement Second of Torts, which states that positive
obligations can arise out of the following special relationships: common carriers,
innkeepers, possessors of land, and those who voluntarily take custody of another owe
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See COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 94 at 23, 278; GEORGE J. ANNAS, LEONARD
H. GLANTZ, & PATRICIA A. ROCHE, THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY, Appendix (1995),
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positive obligations.105 The positive obligations owed to passengers, guests, invitees, or
persons in custody are: (1) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm,
and (2) to render first aid after knowing or having reason to know that they are ill or
injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.106 Such obligations are
owed even if the risk, illness or injury is a result of natural causes or the plaintiff’s own
negligence.107 If a special relationship could be established, the requirement to protect
against unreasonable risk of physical harm would require a person to share genetic
disease information with relatives in at least some circumstances. It is therefore necessary
to consider what types of relationships are special for the purposes of imposition of
affirmative obligations and, in particular, whether certain family relationships are special.
Although section 314A of the Restatement only provides for a finite list of special
relationships, the Caveat states, “The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there
may not be other relations which impose a similar duty.”108 This is clarified in a comment,
which provides in part:
“The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the
only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of another
may be found. There may be other such relations, as for example that of husband
and wife, where the duty is recognized by the criminal law, but there have as yet
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). There are other recognized categories, not set out in
the Restatement and not relevant to the problem under consideration here, such as employees and
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been no decisions allowing recovery in tort in jurisdictions where negligence
actions between husband and wife for personal injuries are permitted. The
question is therefore left open by the Caveat…The law appears, however, to be
working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation
of dependence or mutual dependence.”109
Two bases have been suggested for extending the categories of special
relationships; both are based on features shared by the recognized categories. The first
suggested commonality is that the relationships recognized as special often involve
situations where the defendant has received an economic benefit from the relationship.110
Obviously, family or genetic relationships could not be recognized as a new category on
this basis. The second suggested common feature is that the recognized categories
involve situations where a plaintiff was dependent on the defendant. 111 It is at least
arguable that family members are dependent on one another, either generally or in the
context of genetic disease information.
A plaintiff seeking to make such an argument would need to contend with the fact
that family relationships have not to date been recognized as “special” for the purposes of
SR1. For example, despite the fact that spouses may have affirmative obligations to avoid
109

Id. cmt. b.
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See supra text accompanying note 109. See also Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of
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criminal liability,112 few cases have held that a marital relationship is “special” for the
purposes of owing affirmative duties. 113 In fact, cases considering whether a marital
relationship is “special” for the purpose of creating a duty to control the conduct of one’s
spouse pursuant to SR2 have reached divergent conclusions.114 It is possible that these
cases could be distinguished on the grounds that a person may be in a better position to
assist his or her spouse than to control his or her spouse. In fact, either the inability of
spouses to control one another’s conduct or the undesirability of requiring such control is
cited in the cases declining to treat marital relationships as special. 115 Nevertheless,
because spousal relationships generally carry the most mutual obligations, the mixed
results in those cases might lead to pessimism as to the “specialness” of other family
relationships. In fact, cases considering other family relationships have consistently held
that those relationships are not special for the purpose of creating affirmative duties. Thus
parents owe no special obligations to their son’s girlfriend, 116 adult children owe no
special obligations to their parents,117 a woman does not owe special obligations to her

112
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But see Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (long term marital
relationship is special relationship giving rise to affirmative duties).
114
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husband’s grandchildren,118 and there are no special fiduciary-type obligations between
siblings.119 On the other hand, a person who assumes responsibility for a minor child will
have positive duties, even though there may be no family relationship.120 Thus it seems
that the existence of a family relationship will not alone give rise to positive obligations.
It is possible but unlikely that increased understanding of the nature of genetic
relationships will encourage courts to recognize genetic family relationships as special.121
One might argue that none of the cases rejecting family relationships as special
considered the situation where family members were dependent on each other for genetic
information. However, it has been held that mere knowledge of genetic disease
information pertaining to another does not create a special relationship. In Olson v.
Children’s Home Society of California,122 the California Court of Appeal held that there
was no special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant adoption agency
requiring the agency to inform the plaintiff of the genetic condition affecting the child she
had given up for adoption. Thus neither the existence of a family relationship, nor
reliance on another for genetic disease information, will likely be sufficient to impose
affirmative duties on the proband to share genetic information with family members.
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Nevertheless, it is at least possible (if unlikely) that courts will recognize a special
relationship where both of these elements are present.
3. Patient’s duty to warn – responsibility for harm
As noted above, the Second Restatement of Torts recognizes two circumstances in
which responsibility for the plaintiff’s circumstances creates a positive duty to act. To
recap, a person has an obligation to take reasonable action where:
PA1. that person realizes or should realize that his or her act, whether tortious or
innocent, has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
another;123 or
PA2. that person knows or has reason to know that, by his or her tortious or
innocent conduct, he or she has caused such bodily harm to another as to
make that other helpless and in danger of further harm.124
These provisions raise an issue as to whether people might have a duty to warn direct
descendents of genetic risks, given their involvement in the creation of such risks.
Generally speaking, one’s genetic makeup is inherent; the fact that one has a genetic
disease is not caused or created by the act of an individual. Thus the use of “causation”
language in both PA1 and PA2 argues against imposing liability based on responsibility
for harm. However, Rowe and Silver have hypothesized that PA2 and PA2 are in fact
based on a broader principle that a person is responsible for omissions where action
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would reduce a risk attributable to one’s existence.125 Expressed in this manner, a person
might owe affirmative duties to his or her direct descendants to prevent harm from
genetic causes. Note that the action here would not be wrongful life (the parents should
not have conceived a child) but failure to warn (having conceived a child, the parents
have an obligation to minimize the harm resulting from genetic factors). A claim
expressed on this basis seems doubtful, primarily because there is no reason in principle
for imposing a duty to warn only in situations where the plaintiff is a direct descendent of
the defendant.
The discussion above focuses on the duty to warn a direct descendent of genetic
risks, but separate questions arise while the descendent is still a minor. There is no duty
to “warn” a child during its minority, although there may be positive obligations to
ensure that the child obtains any necessary medical care. State laws often provide for
criminal penalties where parents fail to provide necessary medical care to their minor
children. 126 The ability for children to bring civil actions in negligence for failure to
provide proper medical care depends upon the existence and extent of parental immunity
doctrines, which vary by state.127 It is important to note that any obligation towards a
minor child is an obligation to ensure the child obtains necessary treatment, not an
obligation to provide explanations. The amount of genetic information that a parent
125
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chooses to share with their minor child is likely to be considered a matter of ordinary
parental discretion. 128 Public policy reinforces this state of affairs; a requirement that
parents share genetic disease information with minor children would be particularly
unattractive given the potential psychological consequences for those too immature to
cope.
4. Patient’s duty to warn – analogy with contagious disease cases
From a simplistic outlook, the cases with the most similarity to a possible duty to
warn of genetic disease are the cases establishing a duty to warn of contagious disease.
Physician’s obligations in relation to contagious disease have already been discussed in
Section IV(A)(1) above, but patients also have an independent obligation to warn those
who may be exposed to their infection.129
Of course, in the genetic context, the only people who “expose” others to genetic
disease are parents who pass on their genes to their children. The contagious diseases
cases are unlikely to be helpful to people wishing to sue a parent for passing on a genetic
disease to them in a wrongful life suit.130 Nevertheless, it is at least worth exploring the
possibility that the contagious disease cases could provide a basis for imposing a general
duty to warn those at risk of genetic disease. To do this, it is necessary to re-examine the
rationales offered for liability in the contagious disease context.
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Many of the communicable disease cases rest on reasoning that could not be
imported into the genetic disease context. Cases based directly or indirectly on public
health statutes regulating the conduct of contagious persons cannot be carried over to the
genetic context unless similar statutes were enacted controlling the behavior of persons
carrying certain genes, an unlikely scenario.131 To date, states have understandably shown
a far greater concern for patient privacy than for public health in the genetic disease
context.132 Battery actions based on the fact that consent to sexual intercourse is vitiated
by one partner’s fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with venereal disease are
also specific to their context.133 In particular, it would be a stretch to argue that consent to
sexual intercourse was vitiated because of a lack of knowledge as to the possibility that
one’s sexual partner might carry a gene that, if transmitted to a child conceived of that
sexual relationship, would result in that child having a genetic disease. Another category
of contagious disease cases that are specific to their context are the cases alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress.134
In most contagious disease cases, the plaintiff’s action is based on either
negligence, fraud, or both. Depending on their facts, the plaintiff alleges either
131
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misfeasance (the allegation being that the defendant negligently exposed the plaintiff to
the disease135 or fraudulently misrepresented the truth136) or nonfeasance (failure to warn).
Of the misfeasance cases, those alleging fraudulent misrepresentation might transfer to
the genetic disease context if a person actually lies about their genetic test result, lulling
relatives into a false sense of security. However, only cases involving nonfeasance could
provide a more general basis for analogy.
The cases involving nonfeasance, or failure to warn, allege that the defendant had
a duty to warn the plaintiff of the risk of exposure to a communicable disease and failed
to do so, resulting in liability in fraud or negligence. Although this is phrased in the
language of nonfeasance, there is little difference in substance from allegations of
misfeasance (based on the negligent act of transmitting a disease). It is therefore not clear
that these are true nonfeasance cases.137 Nevertheless, even assuming these cases are in
fact duty-to-rescue cases, they do not go any further than the cases discussed in Section
IV(A)(2) (involving special relationships) and IV(A)(3) (involving responsibility for
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harm).138 The difficulties in relying on such bases for imposing affirmative duties are the
same as those already discussed.
5. Conclusion
Many commentators have suggested that having a general rule that there is no
duty to rescue is problematic.139 There seems little reason in principle to limit recovery in
failure-to-rescue cases to pre-defined categories while positive-action cases rest on more
general principles.140 While one might be more reluctant to impose positive duties than
negative duties, there seems no reason to categorically refuse to impose liability in
situations where a person declines to share important genetic disease information with
those most affected where there are no significant negative consequences in doing so.
Any such obligation would be owed only to those in a limited and easily identifiable class
(close genetic relatives who share a significant risk) so there is no risk that the duty
would involve a requirement to help everyone. In such circumstances, there is no
normative basis for declining to recognize liability using the same general principles that
determine liability for misfeasance.
Currently, however, it would seem that liability would not be imposed on a person
who declines to share genetic disease information with family members no matter how
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extreme the circumstances. A relatively new form of conduct, the refusal to share genetic
disease information with those also affected, fits oddly with the existing legal framework.
The poor fit is primarily the result of recognizing liability only in circumstances
corresponding with judicially formulated categories in the case of nonfeasance, a habit
largely left behind where negligence is based on misfeasance. New technology and new
forms of conduct rarely fit into categories designed prior to their existence.
B. The Duty to Warn and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Despite the fact that there is little chance that a court would conclude that a
person has a legal obligation to share genetic disease information with family members, it
is worth commenting briefly on the possibility that the creation of such a legal obligation
would infringe upon the constitutional right to privacy.141
The right to privacy pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment involves two
branches: the right to make private decisions, such as the decision to marry or abort a
fetus, and the somewhat more questionable right to informational privacy. In Whalen v.
Roe, 142 Justice Stevens explained this dual nature of privacy as follows, “The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two
different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
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important decisions.” 143 Justice Stevens refused to consider whether the statute the
subject of Whalen would be unconstitutional if the data collected pursuant to that statute
were disclosed.144 Thus the right of privacy in information, mentioned briefly, was not
the subject of further discussion, rendering Whalen almost useless in determining the
scope of a privacy right in information. The constitutional interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters was again raised by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,145 although, in that case, privacy rights were only alleged in the context
of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.146
Both Whalen and Nixon are a somewhat vague as to the basis and existence of a
right to informational privacy. At least at the Supreme Court level, the vagueness remains;
the Supreme Court has never used the confidentiality branch of the Fourteenth
Amendment privacy right as the basis for a finding of unconstitutionality. Nevertheless,
the right has received a generally warm reception in the Circuit Courts of Appeal, being
accepted in the second, 147 third, 148 fourth, 149 fifth, 150 seventh, 151 ninth, 152 tenth, 153 and
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eleventh154 circuits but rejected in the sixth155 circuit. Although non-committal, the D.C.
circuit seems reluctant to embrace the notion that the right to privacy includes a right to
confidentiality.156 The first circuit has also adopted a cautious attitude towards the alleged
right.157
If the Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy does have a confidentiality branch,
then personal genetic disease information is likely protected. Courts have recognized the
uniquely private nature of genetic information, 158 which falls within the category of
health information, the most commonly cited example of information protected by the
150

See Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 489-91 (5th Cir. 2002) and cases cited therein, including
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).

151

See Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The Federal Constitution
does, of course, protect certain rights of privacy including a right of confidentiality in certain types of
information.”). See also Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing “a substantial privacy interest in the confidentiality of medical information”).

152

See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The
constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses
medical information and its confidentiality.”); Doe v. Attorney General of the United States, 941 F.2d 780,
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right to confidentiality.159 Further, the second circuit has recognized that information as
to HIV seropositive status is protected due to the risks of discrimination and
stigmatization; protection for genetic information could be justified on the same basis.160
Thus, at least to the extent that most federal courts continue to recognize the
confidentiality branch of the constitutional privacy right, genetic disease information will
receive constitutional protection.
The autonomy branch of the constitutional right to privacy may also be implicated
if citizens were required to share genetic disease information with family members. The
right to make private decisions has been protected under both the rubric of privacy and of
liberty; the distinction is not important here. It was described by the Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey161 as follows,
[M]atters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.162
The Supreme Court has indicated that the autonomy right is limited to matters which are
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.163 The types of matters referred
to by the Supreme Court as falling into this category are matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. 164 A
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decision as to what personal information will be shared with family members arguably
falls within the protected category of “family relationships.” 165 Although most family
relationships cases, including Prince v. Massachusetts,166 the case originally cited for the
inclusion of the category of family relationships in the above list,167 involve the right to
make fundamental decisions as to the care, custody, and control of one’s children,168 the
category is not limited to such cases. For example, in Moore v. East Cleveland,169 the
Supreme Court recognized the right of an extended family to live together under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 170 Thus the freedom to make important decisions affecting a
family’s self-definition are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. On that basis, it is
possible to argue that the decision to share or keep secret genetic disease information is
subject to constitutional protection.
Assuming, as seems likely, that genetic disease information is protected under at
least one branch of the constitutional right to privacy, that protection is not absolute.171 A
court or legislature would not be prevented from imposing a duty to warn, despite the
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privacy implications, if there is a strong interest in disclosure. 172 Thus any institution
imposing a legal obligation to share genetic disease information with family members
would need to be careful to tailor any requirements to the legitimate state interest in the
health of its citizens. This would not be difficult to do; the constitutional right to privacy
implicated in the requirement that sexual partners warn one another about venereal
disease has been held to be outweighed the state’s interest in the prevention and control
of contagious and dangerous diseases.
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Provided disclosure was limited to

circumstances involving significant benefit to life or health, there is no constitutional
barrier to imposing a duty to warn.
C. Duty not to warn
Thus far, this Article has discussed potential liability for failure to warn family
members that they may be at risk of genetic disease. For this purpose, the focus has been
on situations at the left end of the spectrum, where the benefits of disclosure clearly
outweighed the harms. This Section considers whether, in cases at the opposite, right end
of the spectrum, a legal duty to remain silent, protecting the right “not to know,” might be
imposed
1. The law of privacy
While it has been suggested that the tort of invasion of privacy would be an
attractive means of protecting those who prefer not to know genetic information, an
172

United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (“In all cases in which a
court has allowed some intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding medical records, it has usually done
so only after finding that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest on the specific
facts of the case.”)
173

Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273,
276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (N.Y. J. Ct. 1993). See also R.A.P. v. B.J.P.,
428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

47

action on that basis would likely not be successful.174 By far the most thorough analysis
of the possibility of using privacy law in circumstances where a person is harmed by
genetic disease information has been by Laurie;175 there is little benefit in supplementing
his analysis here. Laurie analyzes privacy from two perspectives: informational privacy
and spatial privacy. 176 Informational privacy protects against unauthorized use and
disclosure of information; it is of no assistance where the conduct complained of is the
provision of unwanted information.177 Spatial privacy protects personal or private space
from unwanted intrusion. Laurie argues that spatial privacy would provide a useful guide
in regulating the sharing of personal information. A person ought not approach someone
and impart potentially damaging information without considering the consequences.178
While Laurie suggests that this notion of privacy would provide a useful model
for protecting against unwanted disclosure of genetic disease information, he agrees that
the current law of privacy is insufficient for this purpose. The four privacy rights
commonly recognized are: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2)
appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness, (3) unreasonable publicity given to a
person’s private life, and (4) subjecting an individual to publicity that casts them in a
false light in the public’s eye.179 Of these, the second and fourth are irrelevant. The third,
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like informational privacy referred to above,180 only protects against disclosure of private
information to third parties, it does not protect against receipt of unwanted news. The first
is most analogous to the spatial privacy right suggested above, but does not go as far as
Laurie suggests it should.181 The only conduct that has been recognized as unreasonable
intrusion is conduct where personal information is acquired or removed from someone’s
personal or private space. 182 Thus, cases typically involve illegal searches, physical
invasion of a person’s home, or eavesdropping. 183 No case, according to Laurie, has
successfully alleged unreasonable intrusion where personal information has been added
to someone’s personal or private space.184 Thus, the current law of privacy provides no
basis for suit by a person who is harmed by receipt of genetic disease information.
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2. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress will only aid a person to
whom genetic disease information has been disclosed in extreme cases. In order for such
claim to be successful, the court would need to find that there was an intention to cause
harm through conduct that the reasonable person would consider to be extreme and
outrageous.185 It is possible to imagine a situation in which this might apply. Suppose that
a father and son are both in a family known to carry the gene for Huntington disease and
that the son knows that the father prefers to remain ignorant of his genetic status. The son
is tested and discovers that he carries the gene. If the son informs his father of the result
of this test, the father can be almost certain that he, too, carries the gene and will develop
Huntington disease. Because of the severe consequences that learning of Huntington
disease can have,186 the son’s conduct, if intended to cause harm, might be classified as
extreme and outrageous. Despite such examples, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress cannot provide a generalizable means of protecting the hypothesized
right not to know genetic disease information.
V. Conclusion
As noted at the outset, the decision whether to share genetic disease information
with relatives is a difficult one. Public policy, often the basis of imposing legal duties,
would point towards a duty to warn in cases where failure to warn might have severe
health consequences, and the costs of fulfilling the duty are insignificant. Nevertheless,
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the artificial distinction maintained between liability for misfeasance and nonfeasance
forces a plaintiff contemplating a negligence action to characterize the case in terms of
one of the exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule. A plaintiff would have great difficulty
arguing that the conduct involved fits into any recognized category. On the other hand,
while disclosure of genetic disease information can cause significant harm, there are few
cases where compensation is available. Thus neither “the right to know” nor “the right
not to know” genetic disease information pertaining to oneself is likely to receive legal
protection through obligations on family members who are in possession of such
information.
Not everyone will share the view that such rights should be legally recognized.
However, the new context of secret genetic disease information does at least pose new
questions. A refusal to impose liability for silence cannot rest on the traditional rationales
for the no-duty-to-rescue rule and yet is not covered by previously recognized categories
of exceptions to the rule. At least some might think that the tort of privacy should be
extended to protect against receipt of unwanted information. If rationales are offered for
refusing to change the legal status quo, these will be new rationales, not those used to
formulate the rule initially. Until new rationales are offered, there is a tension between
existing rules and new forms of conduct that commentators will discuss, perhaps
observing that the law has not yet “caught up” with the genetic revolution. The tension
will only be resolved when an institution, whether a legislature or a court, is forced to
consider the consequences of applying old rules in this new context.
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